Tag Archives: Democratic Party

Leverage and the fiscal cliff

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Unsurprisingly, Joshua Green sees a highly favorable situation for Obama now:

To keep the economy afloat, the White House cut the deals it felt it had to. Many, such as Obama’s agreement to extend all of the Bush tax cuts in 2010, were poorly received by Democrats. Now comes the payoff. The expiration of those cuts and the automatic reductions set to take effect at year’s end—the so-called fiscal cliff—mean that Obama and the Democrats can gain a huge source of new revenue by doing nothing at all. Republican priorities are the ones suddenly in peril. The combination of tax increases on the rich, higher capital-gains taxes, and sharp cuts in defense spending have congressional Republicans deeply worried. To mitigate these, they’ll have to bargain.

Despite their post-election tough talk, Republican leaders have dealt themselves a lousy hand. Obama can propose a “middle-class tax cut” for the 98 percent of American households earning less than $250,000 a year—while letting the Bush tax cuts expire for those earning more—and dare the Republicans to block it. If they do, everyone’s taxes will rise on Jan. 1. It’s true that going over the fiscal cliff, as some Democrats believe will happen, would set back the recovery and could eventually cause a recession. But Democratic leaders in Congress believe the public furor would be too intense for Republicans to withstand for long.

Going over the cliff would also weaken the Republicans’ greatest point of leverage: renewing their threat to default on the national debt. Right now, the Treasury expects to hit the debt ceiling in February. But if the cliff can’t be avoided, tax rates will rise and government coffers will swell, delaying the date of default—thus diminishing the Republicans’ advantage. Alice Rivlin, the founding director of the Office of Management and Budget and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, says that “as quickly as the IRS began changing the withholding schedule, the date would be pushed back.”

My goal this Election Day

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Today, America goes to the polls. Mercifully, nearly two years of incessant campaign coverage (including nearly 30 presidential debates in total) will come to an end, assuming no last-minute recounts or hijinks. But barring a surprise wave election, in which one of the two major parties suffers massive defeats in the presidential race as well as in both houses of Congress, our bipartisan gridlock is likely to continue.

That even the apportionment of blame for this sad state of affairs is hotly debated is proof positive of the lengths to which we’ve entangled ourselves into partisan herds. Republican obstinacy faces off against Democratic radicalism in the eyes of their respective adherents. Most problematically, one of the few remaining points of bipartisan coordination is seen in the increasing trend towards ideological rigidity – on both sides.

I have seen this in my own relationship to the political sphere over the last four years. In 2008, I was an undergraduate student voting, without overwhelming enthusiasm, for Barack Obama. I was never able to locate in myself the passionate embrace of the Illinois senator that had so enraptured many of my peers. I respected John McCain and would not have been severely disappointed had he won.

Four years later, I admit to frequent panic at the thought of a Mitt Romney presidency. My discomfort with the Republican platform has morphed into a visceral disgust for most of its standard-bearers. I mock the minor gaffes committed by the tireless tag-team of Romney and Paul Ryan while largely excusing Obama’s as mere faux pas. I deride the elitism of Romney’s “47%” commentary while allowing Obama’s mention of “[clinging] to guns and religion” to fade into the past.

To be clear, I am not peddling false equivalency. Anyone who has followed my blog on a casual basis for the past several months would have little doubt as to where I lay the vast majority of the blame for the current state of American politics. But my mounting distaste for Republican policy and rhetoric has perceptibly nudged me further in the opposite direction. My own views have solidified, less the result of conducting painstaking research and more a visceral reaction to what I viewed as inflammatory and bitter actions from my ideological opposites.

It seems clear that this division is infecting all aspects of our political culture. Mitt Romney has been downright evasive regarding the release of his tax returns, but Harry Reid’s absurd claim that Romney may not have paid any taxes at all for a decade was greeted with cheers by many on the left. Would this have happened before: a party so decrying the missteps of its opponents that it gleefully fights unreasonableness with rhetorical extremism of its own?

A similar vortex has swallowed the debate over national healthcare. When Republican opposition to the Affordable Care Act devolved into absolutist obstructionism without any hint of compromise, many of us (including myself) gradually moved from cautious support of the bill to full-throated endorsement. Unfortunately, a real debate is sorely needed to determine what exactly can reduce the skyrocketing costs associated with healthcare coverage in this country. But the decision by one party to halt all discussions need not be met with equivalent foot-stomping by its counterparts.

How, then, should we respond? And by “we” I refer not only to liberals and others who share my dismal outlook on the collective Republican identity: I include also Republicans whose own more sensible positions have shifted slowly rightward under the rising pressure of a red-vs.-blue war. If the opposing party is truly as denialist or radical or obstinate as we believe, what options do we have?

On a practical level, there may be little that can be achieved. But ratcheting down hyperbolism and the most abrasive rhetoric will certainly help. Whatever competitive advantage the expression of vitriol may once have facilitated in shaping public perception has certainly evaporated in the face of equally irate counterattacks.

More crucially, detaching ourselves from the entrenched binary mentality that handcuffs us to our respective parties will allow us to reevaluate our elected leaders from a more clear-headed standpoint. All too often, a unified and angry opposition has compelled many of us to move from a mild preference for a certain party platform to an enthusiastic embrace of even its more dubious propositions – including policies that we once opposed.

This is how, for example, President George W. Bush’s warrantless wiretapping program was rightly castigated by liberals as an existential threat to the public’s constitutional freedoms, while Barack Obama’s extrajudicial assassination of American citizens has prompted little more than muted protests. It’s how many Democrats scoffed at Bush’s muscular use of drones while praising Obama’s decision to then ramp up the rate of drone strikes.

As liberals, our primary responsibility is to a set of ideals, not to a thoroughly vetted, compromised, and stripped-down document attempting to represent the broad tent that is the Democratic Party. Conservatives, too, must remember that their own principles of lean government and open markets should trump the narrow interests of a Republican Party still beholden to the incoherence of Tea Party demagogues and xenophobic agitators.

For the next four years, regardless of who wins tonight, my goal is to avoid the reflexive castigation of conservative proposals that has steadily crept into my decision-making process. A nation with two healthy parties is a far stronger one than a nation with none. But it’s up to all of us to subject our ideological compatriots to the same degree of thoughtful critique as we extend to our political opposites.

The Democrats’ tent is about to get bigger

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David Wasserman takes a look at the glory and the peril of the impending demographic milestone for the Democratic Party:

The Cook Political Report projects that when a new Congress is sworn into office in January,  white males will for the first time in American history be a minority of one party’s caucus in the House. It’s a milestone that Democrats will celebrate regardless of whether Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi wins back the speaker’s gavel.

Yet the party will pay a price for making this history: The Democrats’ path to power in the House will likely be rockier than ever. As more Democratic-friendly minority-majority districts result from redistricting, and as the Democratic caucus gravitates to the left, Republicans have strengthened their grip on the vast number of seats in less-affluent, predominantly white areas. These are boom times for nonwhite Democrats in the House, and more nonwhite than white Democrats tend to be women. But these are also bust times for white Democratic men.

The 2012 cycle represents a rare alignment of the stars. It’s the first time in 20 years that the strong minority turnout of a presidential election cycle will coincide with a bonanza of new and open seats following the census and redistricting. After decades of progress, minorities and women running for Congress were already poised for a banner year, yet the pace of change is picking up as November approaches.

For the love of all things holy, stop distorting the tax debate

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Pulitzer Prize-winning author Buzz Bissinger has a column today on the Daily Beast titled “Why I’m Voting for Mitt Romney:”

By instinct I still cling to my Democrat roots. But I admit that as I get older, on the cusp of 58, I am moving more to the center or even tweaking right, or at least not tied to any ideology. Those making more than $250,000 should pay more taxes, and that does include me. But I also am tired of Obama’s constant demonization, of those he spits out as “millionaires and billionaires,” as pariahs. Romney’s comments at a fundraiser were stupid, but 47 percent of Americans do not pay federal income taxes. Yes, a majority are poor and seniors. But millions do not pay such taxes with incomes of more than $50,000, and whether it’s as little as $10, every American should contribute both as a patriotic obligation and skin in the game. This is our country, not our country club.

This constant emphasis on the “47 percent of Americans [that] do not pay federal income taxes” is as boring and repetitive as it is completely and utterly irrelevant. The fact that this figure continues to play a large role in our national tax discussion is proof positive of the utter lack of due diligence on the part of journalists around the nation, who’ve collectively abdicated their responsibility to readers by failing to dig deeper.

So for the millionth time, federal income tax rates do not matter. Total tax rates matter. Think about it: what is the central issue in today’s tax arguments? The key question is one of progressivity and fairness: how much, if at all, should tax rates rise with income levels? Should the poor have to pay the same percentage of their total income to their federal, state, and local governments as the rich do? Or should taxes paid to all levels of government rise relative to income, as income itself rises? Responses to this question are as numerous as respondents, and that’s OK.

It’s absolutely absurd, on the other hand, for people to continue basing their tax system preferences on deliberately misleading data. Federal income taxes cover only one portion of total tax liabilities. There are, additionally, payroll taxes, state taxes, and local taxes. And this is the key problem with using only federal income tax rates as indicative of anything.

The Republican Party knows this. It’s why its standard-bearer, Mitt Romney, insisted on the self-victimization of the 47% who don’t pay federal income tax — because it’s a number that sounds incredibly high, a number that advances the GOP’s agenda and lends legitimacy to the accusation of “class warfare” against Barack Obama.

The problem is that, just as one would expect, isolating the most politically advantageous portion of Americans’ total tax liabilities produces a phenomenally distorted piece of data. (Imagine if the Democratic Party insisted its national platform was widely supported throughout the entire nation, based on a poll conducted exclusively among New York City residents. This is an extreme hypothetical, to be sure, but it’s illustrative of the type of thinking being used by Republicans to disguise the truth about taxes.)

So what is the total income and tax intake of Americans? Here’s a helpful graph, courtesy of Mother Jones, that includes 2009 income and tax data:

Notice a couple things. First, the bars are not equally distributed: the first four pairs represent the lowest four quintiles of the American population by income level, while the last four pairs collectively constitute the top 20%. This is necessary because the top income quintile dwarfs the other quintiles, and leaving it in one piece would render the graph more difficult to interpret in a useful way.

Secondly, the share of total taxes paid by each slice of the population is roughly equivalent to its share of national income. In other words, our tax system is much, much less progressive than Mitt Romney & Co. would have us believe. And this is why, when politicians and — even worse — journalists start throwing around numbers like 47%, it would behoove us to look into the data instead of taking it at face value. It also means that, if anyone’s conducting class warfare, it certainly isn’t Barack Obama.

 

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#10: Notes from the Cracked Ceiling

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Anne E. Kornblut, a White House reporter for the Washington Post, is impatient to see a woman in the White House — and not another First Lady, either. Her book, Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and What It Will Take for a Woman to Win, is easy (yet purposeful) reading. But lest her novelistic tone deceive you, let it be clear that her views on the necessity of recruiting more female political candidates are never in question. Having personally followed the two aforementioned presidential hopefuls during their campaigns, Kornblut has seen firsthand the unique abuse lavished upon female candidates. In her introduction, she argues that Clinton and Palin “may not have lost because they were women…but their sex played an outsize role in the year’s events.” She then closes that section with the observation that “the glass ceiling may be cracked…but it is far from broken.”

What, then, is keeping women from breaking through that glass? History is an obvious culprit, but Kornblut is disinclined to let the present off the hook so easily. More specifically, she faults the candidates and their large teams of handlers, who often waged behind-the-scenes battles over their candidates’ public self-portrayal. Should Hillary exude toughness, or feminine restraint? How about a combination of the two? Would it help if her daughter, Chelsea, campaigned along with her? In one potent example of poor decision-making, Kornblut details the various Christmas commercials the presidential candidates aired in December 2007. While Obama focused on his home and family, Clinton devoted her airtime to wrapping Christmas presents with labels such as “universal health care” and “bring troops home.” “It was hard,” Kornblut wryly notes, “to quit being tough.”

Of course, Hillary Clinton eventually lost the Democratic nomination, but not without some help from the national media. Was their constant bombardment indicative of sexism, or simply a reaction to the Clinton camp’s preexisting ambivalence towards the press corps? Kornblut seems to think there is some of both, but the mass public’s embrace of some of the more vicious ad hominem attacks on Clinton lend credence to allegations that it was more the former than the latter.

Clinton’s demise was soon overshadowed by the meteoric rise of Sarah Palin, the governor of Alaska. Kornblut does an admirable job retracing Palin’s time on the campaign trail, especially in noting how quickly the high praise was overtaken by vitriolic condemnation. And while it is true that public commentary on Palin soon reflected sexist undertones, Kornblut at times seems unable to completely separate these attacks from the legitimate criticisms, most prominent of which was Palin’s lack of a grasp on even basic domestic and foreign policy issues and her disastrous performances in network interviews. That Palin became a favorite target of the Democratic base was undeniable, but that this was largely due to her gender is much less apparent.

Furthermore, Kornblut missed a golden opportunity to delve deeper into one of the more fascinating subplots of Palin’s candidacy — namely, that of her role within the historical feminist movement. Traditionally, feminists were assumed to adhere to more liberal ideology, which in its most common incarnation usually included a pro-choice stance and a general alignment with the Democratic Party. So when Palin, a mother of five with strong pro-life views, became the vice presidential nominee, it seemed almost as if the modern feminist movement had reached a fork in the road. Kornblut had noted earlier how many women in their twenties had voted for Obama over Clinton in the Democratic primaries, confident in their belief that voting based on competence and ideology over gender politics epitomized a more authentic form of gender equality. With Palin, older models of feminism were once again being strained: was Palin’s candidacy, given her conservative views (especially on abortion), a betrayal of feminist ideals, or was it reflective of a new wave of female ascendancy representing all points on the political spectrum?

Kornblut gives this tension a brief nod when she notes that “if Clinton had epitomized the feminist movement’s dream, Palin was in many ways its worst nightmare.” Entire volumes could be written on this subject, and in that Kornblut’s book was ostensibly intended to ask these and similar questions, the fact that she devoted just several pages to Palin’s role within feminism was disappointing. Similarly glaring in its absence was any discussion of female minority voters who faced the difficult and historic choice between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in the Democratic presidential primaries. The question of which identity holds strongest — race or gender — was ignored in Kornblut’s analysis, a surprising omission in an election for which identity took center stage.

Towards the end of the book, Kornblut contrasts the American political experience for women with that of other countries. The comparison is not flattering to the United States. For Kornblut, however, the upside to the disappointment of two women narrowly losing out in the 2008 elections is that countless lessons can be taken from their failures — shortcomings that were as much the fault of their advisers, the media, and an unpredictable electorate as they were of the candidates themselves. With shrewd recruitment and well-planned campaigns, women will continue to challenge the gender status quo in politics. It remains to be seen when this will happen, but the shattering of the glass ceiling is long overdue.